Can Exchanges of Anonymized Disaggregated Data Facilitate Collusion?

The exchange of information among competitors poses inherent risks to competition. Antitrust guidelines favor aggregated data exchanges and endorse anonymization as a safeguard against collusion. However, the impact of data aggregation and anonymization on collusion remains relatively underexplored in economic literature.

Dr. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Dr. Pedro Erdei-Gonzaga, Dr. Albert Metz, and Ben Wagner argue that exchanging disaggregated data increases the risk of collusion by enabling competitors to monitor each other’s actions effectively. They conclude that data anonymization is unlikely to act as an effective safeguard against collusion when competitors exchange disaggregated data for monitoring purposes, underscoring the importance of antitrust guidelines on exchanges of information favoring aggregated data exchanges.

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